International agreements are likely to stimulate greenhouse gas mitigation efforts. Agriculture can participate either as a source of emission reductions or as a sink for gas emission storage. Emission
effort to efficiently reduce emissions, a market is likely to emerge where agricultural interests could sell emission offsets.
The paper examines agriculture's role in greenhouse gas emission reduction efforts and reviews the literature on the potential costs of such a role. Specifically it addresses: How might agriculture participate in or be influenced by greenhouse gas emission reduction efforts? How might an agricultural greenhouse gas emission reduction role be implemented? What characteristics of agriculture might be relevant in formulating greenhouse gas emission reduction policy?
There are a number of agricultural strategies available which are likely to exhibit lower costs than current opportunities in non-agricultural industries. Several agricultural sink strategies, i.e. planting trees on agricultural land, may be time limited and may offset less and less emissions as time goes on.
However, these strategies could be used as bridge to the future for non-agricultural strategies. There are also potential positive externalities from adoption of strategies to promote greenhouse gas emission reduction. Property rights of land owners need to be considered in policy formation.
given area, changes in crop yields, changes in irrigation water requirements and supply, and changes in cost of production. Many scientists believe the risks of negative impacts across society outweigh potential benefits (Bruce, Lee, and Haites) and suggest that society reduce net GHGE to insure that future problems do not arise. Currently, many countries are considering policy actions regarding net GHGE emission reductions.
The Kyoto Protocol
In 1992, the UNFCCC was established with the "ultimate objective ... to achieve ... stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system" (p. 9). As of October 1998, 176 countries had signed the convention. However, the convention does not specify either GHG concentration targets or emission reduction levels. The Geneva conference in 1996, the Kyoto conference in 1997, the Buenos
Aires conference in 1998, and the Bonn conference in 1999 were intended to create more specific targets.
In Kyoto, a first agreement was reached (Bolin) . Thirty-eight countries, mainly developed nations in North America, Europe, Asia, and Australia, agreed to reduce emissions of six greenhouse gases [carbon dioxide (CO 2 ), methane (CH 4 ), nitrous oxide (N 2 O), hydro-fluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulphur hexafluoride (SF 6 ) ] to five to eight percent below 1990 levels.
U.S. negotiators agreed to reduce emissions by seven percent. The resultant, commonly called, Kyoto protocol requires each participating party to "have made demonstrable progress in its commitments" (p.9) by 2005 and to achieve the emission reductions within the period 2008 to 2012. In addition to emission reductions, the treaty approves offsets through enhancement of sinks which absorb greenhouse gases.
Agriculture (using a definition including forestry) is mentioned as both an emitter and a sink in the protocol. Annex A of the Protocol lists agriculture as an emission sources from enteric fermentation 1 , manure management, rice cultivation, soil management, field burning, and deforestation.
The protocol also lists agriculturally related sinks of afforestation and reforestation. Additional sources and sinks are under consideration.
How Might Agriculture Participate in or be Influenced by GHGE Reduction Efforts?
There are at least four ways agriculture may participate in or be influenced by greenhouse gas mitigation efforts.
!
Agriculture may need to reduce emissions because it releases substantial amounts of methane, nitrous oxide, and carbon dioxide.
! Agriculture may enhance its absorption of GHGE by creating or expanding sinks.
Agriculture may provide products which substitute for GHGE intensive products displacing emissions.
! Agriculture may find itself operating in a world where commodity and input prices have been altered by GHGE related policies.
We deal with each of these ways providing cost estimates and literature citations where available. Our treatment of the literature is as global as possible but is undoubtably biased toward U.S. sources.
Agriculture -A Source of Greenhouse Gases
Agriculture's global share of anthropogenic emissions has been estimated to be about fifty percent of methane, seventy percent of nitrous oxide, and twenty percent of carbon dioxide (see Cole et al., Isermann) . Contributions across countries vary with large differences existing between developing and developed countries. Developing country agriculturally based emissions largely arise from deforestation and land degradation. Developed country agriculturally based emissions are largely caused by fossil fuel based emissions through energy use; reductions in soil carbon through intensive tillage; nitrous oxide emissions through fertilizer applications, livestock feeding, residue management, and tillage (Watson et al.) ; methane emissions from livestock raising and rice production (Hayhoe) .
Within livestock production about two thirds of methane emissions stem from enteric fermentation of ruminant animals, mainly cattle with the rest from animal waste. Costs of agricultural GHGE reduction strategies have been examined by a number of authors (see Tables 1 and 2 for a summary).
Methane
Gerbens reviewed manure management alternatives and dietary changes for enteric fermentation management. The combined additive effect of all enteric fermentation strategies is shown in Figure 1 . Gibbs estimated the costs of liquid manure management improvements ( Figure 2 ) and Adams et al. (1992) examined the effect of reduced high-energy feed rations, and tax induced demand shifts for beef. Gerbens asserts that almost all treatments aimed to reduce methane from enteric fermentation would be more profitable than currently used technologies. The studies also indicate that the total reduction potential from enteric fermentation strategies is significantly lower than for livestock manure management.
Seven percent of current methane emissions (the U.S. target level under Kyoto) amounts to 1.5 million metric tons methane. Both Gerbens and Gibbs estimated that liquid manure treatment has the potential to reduce methane emissions by that amount at costs ranging between $100 and $200 per ton carbon equivalent. Adams et al. (1992) , at a one million ton reduction level, calculated average costs for methane emission reductions ranging from about $100 (rice) to $700 (beef tax) per ton carbon equivalent.
Nitrous Oxide
Cost estimates for nitrous oxide emission reductions have been developed assuming relevant strategies are: a) reduced nitrogen fertilizer applications, b) use of nitrification inhibitors, c) improved nitrogen nutrient management, and d) reduced nitrogen content of animal feeds. The cost estimates vary widely in part due to the uncertainty in the magnitudes of emission levels. Battye, Werner, and
Hallberg found reduced nitrogen content poultry feed to cost $1,300 per ton carbon equivalent while potential low protein amino acid supplements to swine feed could reduce feeding costs by $1,400 per ton carbon equivalent saved. In addition, Battye, Werner, and Hallberg argue improved nitrogen nutrient management can reduce emissions at cost savings. Average costs for nitrous oxide emissions from reducing anhydrous and total nitrogen fertilizer use were estimated in the neighborhood of $50 per ton carbon (Adams et al. 1992, Harnisch) . About 0.13 million metric tons of N 2 O emissions need to be reduced in order to meet the Kyoto requirements 2 .
Carbon Dioxide
The volume of CO 2 emission reductions from agriculture is relatively low and thus will receive only brief mention here. Agricultural sources of carbon dioxide emissions from fuel use are minor relative to total societal emissions. U.S. EPA estimated agricultural emissions in 1996 from fossil fuel use to be less than one percent of the U.S. total emissions of 4,900 million metric tons of CO 2 .
Soil carbon dioxide emissions have been larger in the past. In the first half of this century, Donigian et al. argue that for the central U.S. land conversion to agriculture decreased soil organic matter (SOM) to about fifty percent of its native level but the land base is not now expanding. While SOM remained relatively stable through 1970 (Allison) , it then increased reflecting increased rates of reduced tillage systems (Flach, Barnwell, and Crosson) . Similarly, total forest lands in the U.S. have been slightly increasing during the last decade (U.S. Forest Service). In countries with significant rates of deforestation emissions are significant. Houghton estimates that between twenty-five and thirty-one percent of global carbon emissions come from tropical deforestation and subsequent land degradation.
Agriculture -A Carbon and GHG Sequestering Sink
Another way to reduce net emissions is to increase absorption of GHG into the ecosystem through use of for example the soil or forests as a sink. This strategy is also commonly called carbon sequestration.
Soil Sequestration
Currently, U.S. agricultural soils hold about seven billion metric tons of carbon (Kern) . the costs of carbon sequestration on cropland through reduced tillage generating estimates ranging from $0 to about $400 per ton of carbon depending on level sequestered (Table 3) .
Soils also provide a sink for other gases, but much less is known. Estimates indicate that soils take up between ten and twenty percent of methane emissions (Reeburgh, Whalen, and Alperin) . The soil sink of nitrous oxide is not well understood at the present time (Watson et al.) . Studies (Mosier et al.) on grasslands indicate that conversion of grasslands to croplands tends to increase net emissions of nitrous oxide and methane. The net increase of methane emissions is due to a diminished soil sink capacity of cultivated land for methane.
Forest Sequestration
One management alternative that has been repeatedly examined involves conversion of agricultural lands to tree plantations (Table 3) . Carbon is subsequently stored in the forest soil, the growing tree and any products which take up long term residence in buildings etc. Recent estimates of the average costs of sequestering carbon by tree plantations have been developed by Adams et al. (1999) . Four selected carbon-fixing goals yielded undiscounted average annual costs between $13 and $26 per ton carbon. Their results were consistent with those of a number of previous studies (Winjum et al.; Dudek and Leblanc; Moulton and Richards; Adams et al.,1992; McCarl 
Agriculture -A Way of Offsetting Net Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Agriculture could also be involved in providing substitutes for products whose use causes substantial greenhouse gas emissions. In particular, this could occur through use of agricultural commodities as biofuels replacing fossil fuels or through substitution of wood products for more GHGE intensive building materials.
Biomass for Power Plants
Substitution for fossil fuels generally involves using agricultural products as feedstock for A number of studies have examined the costs of biomass fuel substitution (recent ones are summarized in Table 4 ). The cost of CO 2 offsets with biomass-fueled electrical power plants can be 
Liquid Fuel Production -Ethanol
Carbon emissions can also be offset by converting corn or other cellulose laden products into ethanol substituting for petroleum. Again this would recycle the majority of the GHGE from fuel use. Figure 5 shows ethanol based carbon emission reduction costs derived using the data in Jerko.
Building Products Substitution
Marland and Schlamadinger argue that increased use of wood in construction, while increasing carbon emissions from the forest products industry, reduces net emissions since it creates larger savings through reduced use of fossil fuels in the concrete block or steel industries. The authors, however, do not provide estimates of carbon equivalent costs.
Agriculture -Operating in a Mitigating World
Agriculture could be affected by greenhouse gas reduction policies which are largely directed toward other sectors. In particular, efforts to reduce emissions are likely to rise fossil fuel prices. For example, sellers of diesel fuel might have to purchase an emissions permit which would increase fuel prices. Similarly, fuel taxes might be imposed. Such increases would not only influence the cost of petro-based agricultural chemicals and fuel inputs but also alter off-farm commodities prices.
There have been a few economic examinations done 5 
How Might a Country Implement GHGE Reductions?
A system of incentives or regulations will be needed to secure participation in GHGE mitigation.
The Kyoto Protocol establishes country-specific GHGE reduction targets, but provides flexibility in meeting these targets. It emphasizes "application of market instruments" to achieve the "quantified emission limitations" on a national level. Limits are not placed on individual emitters but rather on the whole country, and it is anticipated that domestic trading systems will be established. However, individual emitters are obligated to annually account, report, and verify their emissions. No provisions have been made yet for emissions trading between time periods, commonly called banking.
Markets for Emissions Trading
Markets for emissions trading should be at the top list of policy options to cost-effectively manage emissions (Sandor and Skees) . Several emissions trading programs have been implemented.
Examples in the U.S. are the Emissions Credit Trading (1977), the U.S. Lead Phase down (1982) , and the Acid Rain Program (1995). Current policy debate on GHGE reduction implementation suggests that an emissions trading system much like the one used for the U.S. acid deposition program will be put in place. This system uses a cap and trade approach and has been successful in bringing down SO 2 emissions (Tietenberg et al.) . It permits emitters who bear high costs from emission reductions to buy emission rights from lower cost emitters. 
Taxation or Subsidization
In addition to emissions trading, the Kyoto Protocol leaves open the possibility of taxes and subsidies. The nonpoint source nature of greenhouse gas emissions would again likely make it necessary to tax or subsidize inputs rather than emissions. Fossil fuel taxes may be employed because they have low transaction costs and yield revenues that can be used to finance other mitigation policies.
Increased fossil fuel prices can also create a considerable economic incentive for emission saving technologies.
Trading Across Gases
Trading may be allowed across the spectrum of greenhouse gases. To place the gases on an equal footing, the IPCC developed the concept of global warming potential (GWP) which compares greenhouse gas ability to trap heat in the atmosphere. The IPCC uses carbon dioxide as a reference gas and calculates GWPs for three reference time horizons: 20, 100, and 500 years. For example, over a 100-year time horizon, one metric ton of methane and 21 metric tons of carbon dioxide trap an equal amount of heat in the atmosphere so the GWP of methane is 21. Equivalently, the GWP of nitrous oxide is 310. The other gases HFCs, PFCs, and SF 6 have GWPs of several thousand.
Implementation of trading systems across gases is likely to involve some type of uncertainty discounting. As argued above, emission reductions will have to be estimated upstream, hence uncertainties arise. The degree of these uncertainties, however, seems to differ widely between different GHG mitigation strategies. Nitrous oxide emissions savings from improved fertilizer management, for example, vary to a much higher degree, than do carbon dioxide emissions savings from reduced fossil fuel use. Thus, in a risk adverse society, the value of emission credits from fairly uncertain nitrous oxide reductions should be discounted relative to the value of emission credits from almost perfectly predictable carbon dioxide emission reductions. For example, Canada has proposed that carbon credits be determined in terms of a confidence interval.
Trading Across Countries
Four international implementation mechanisms are authorized. These include bubbles, emission trades, joint implementation, and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The bubble approach permits groups of Annex B 6 countries of the Kyoto Protocol to merge their emissions compliance, setting few restrictions on trading within those country groups. The U.S. has reached a conceptual agreement with Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Russia and Ukraine to pursue a bubble group (U.S. DOS). Bubbles reduce the incentive for non-compliance through the joint responsibility of both the individual members and the regional organization. However, bubbles may result in efficiency losses compared to emissions trading for they restrict permit trading within the bubble member countries.
Emissions trading would allow Annex B countries to purchase or sell emission rights to any other such country. Each international transaction must be reported to and approved by the UNFCCC secretariat. The relevant modalities, rules and guidelines for these transactions still need to be defined.
In principle, emissions trading could be authorized at the governmental level or at a sub-national entity level. The latter would increase trade efficiency.
Joint implementation (JI) refers to multi-national projects within Annex B countries, where involved parties can receive emission reduction units (ERUs). JI can be viewed as supplemental option to emissions trading. Instead of buying emissions allowances from another eligible party, a country can also directly finance and supervise emission reduction projects in that country. This can be more efficient than emissions trading, particularly, when significant technological differences exist between countries. The importance of JI, however, may be small with respect to the agricultural sector.
Through the Clean Development Mechanism, Annex B countries can secure certified emission reductions (CERs) in non-Annex B developing countries which are not subjected to emission reduction targets. The Clean Development Mechanism is especially favored by countries like the U.S. who are likely to buy additional emission allowances from outside to meet their national commitment. By integrating low cost emission reduction options in developing countries, this mechanism would result in a lower market price for emission permits.
Monitoring and Verification
A recurring theme in the Kyoto Protocol is the monitoring and verification of carbon emissions and sinks. To have a viable market in credits there needs to be a commodity that can be clearly identified and reliably and consistently measured. Marland, McCarl and Schneider note the possibility that GHG credits could depend on the uncertainty in their measurement. For example, Canada has proposed that credits could be claimed only to the extent that there was ninety-five percent certainty in the amount of carbon sequestered.
What Characteristics of Agriculture Might be Relevant in Formulating GHGE

Mitigation Policy?
Agricultural policies have always been subject to controversial debates. Features of recent U.S. farm programs have been shown to induce changes in agricultural management and resource use.
For example, the deficiency payment scheme motivated farmers to produce more. In this section, we will discuss characteristics of agriculture that should be considered in formulating GHGE mitigation policies.
Positive and Negative Externalities
Pursuit of agriculturally based policies limited to carbon sequestration can have a number of possibly, unintended beneficial and detrimental external effects. A total weighing of the externalities may be key to policy formation.
Potential Positive Externalities
When McCarl, Gowen, and Yeats examined the effects of carbon permit prices, they found that the policy stimulated widespread expansion of conservation tillage and a large reduction in soil erosion. A country bears a number of costs due to erosion in terms of water quality, ecology, sedimentation, etc. that would be reduced by increased use of conservation tillage. Thus, a policy Many other cases could be cited but the basic point has been made. There could be positive environmental and economic benefits (externalities) arising out of policies intended to reduce CO 2 accumulation in the atmosphere.
Potential Negative Externalities
Along with the possibility of unintended benefits, there is the possibility of unintended costs.
Here is a short list of possible negative externalities: a) Adams et al. (1992) , and more recently McCarl, show that programs designed to move agricultural lands into forestry could have deleterious effects on the traditional forest sector, leading to either deforestation of traditional parcels or reduced incomes.
b)
Reductions in intensity of tillage have in cases been found to require additional use of pesticides for weed, fungus, and insect management. This may have deleterious effects on ecological systems, runoff, and water quality. c) Expanded use of agricultural lands for carbon sequestration increases the competition with traditional food and fiber production. The result might well be decreased food and fiber production; increased consumer prices for crops, meat and fiber; and decreased export earnings from agriculture.
Again, many other cases could be cited, but the basic point has been made. There could be negative environmental externalities arising out of policies intended to reduce emissions or increase carbon sequestration.
Political Will for Public Intervention and Farm Support
Historically, the agricultural sector in many countries has received substantial public subsidies in the form of price and income supports. Today, U.S. farm subsidies have been reduced. However, there is also increasing pressure from farm interests to get back into the farm program business, particularly given low current prices for agricultural commodities. GHGE reductions under the Kyoto Protocol raise new possibilities for income supports. Perhaps a new breed of farm programs could be justified with funding based on energy and GHGE savings.
Also the emergence of a carbon offset market could reduce the government role. Private agricultural and non agricultural interests contracting for carbon would provide a new source of private income to farmers.
Demand Characteristics
Most agricultural production is up against an inelastic demand curve. People do not eat a great deal more even if food costs less, so increased production is often matched by declining prices.
However, producing biofuels for the energy market would probably place agriculture as a fairly small player producing against an elastic demand curve. The carbon market may have similar characteristics.
Such a market would not yield such large price reductions when agricultural carbon credits are included and would yield producer benefits, as opposed to consumer gains as has been the prevalent recent case. Adding such a market would have income distribution implications.
Practical Sectoral Economics
From a practical standpoint when considering both how to garner agricultural participation and how such participation might influence the economics of the agricultural sector, there are a number of important economic questions.
Are the Comparative Costs of Agricultural Net GHGE Reductions Low Enough?
Are comparatively cheap emission reductions of sink enhancements available? Will non-agricultural interests buy carbon credits from agricultural interests? Anecdotal evidence seems to suggest that this is the case, but the demand by non-agricultural interests for carbon credits is not clear. which emissions credits will be traded internationally and which countries will participate, and when the program is implemented. Many cost estimates exceed $100 per ton of carbon.
Will a Carbon Program Disrupt the Traditional Agricultural Sector?
The economic impacts on the traditional agricultural sector participants depend on the intensity of mitigation efforts. The more agriculture enters the GHGE business the less there will be conventional agricultural production. Some mitigation strategies may be competitive (biofuel, ethanol, forestation) and some may be complementary (management alterations) to existing land uses. Competitive strategies will decrease conventional agricultural production and cause prices for food commodities to rise. However, such rises may induce further innovation and resources into the sector. With inelastic demand curves as often encountered for food commodities, producers are likely to gain but consumers will probably lose. Land prices would likely rise as consequence of the competition between crops used for food and crops including trees used directly for mitigation strategies, such emission sequestration and biofuel generation. The total issue portends shifts in the distribution of income between agricultural producers and consumers. We also need to consider the costs and benefits of the negative and positive program externalities, including, ideally, the costs and benefits of a changing climate.
Will the Farmer Participate
Many physical scientists evaluate farmer mitigation strategies and conclude there are "win-win" possibilities available asserting that the farmer would make money, emissions would be lowered, and often there would be positive environmental externalities. However, the adoption of such strategies by farmers is not granted. Farmers do not choose a "winning" strategy from a social or scientific point of view, they choose the "best" winning strategy available to them. Thus the strategy chosen must dominate the other strategies available from farmers' viewpoint. Farmers may not choose a profitable reduced tillage method if a more profitable intensive tillage method is available. In addition, a number of other factors will enter into their decisions. In particular:
a) Risk is a consideration. Farmers who switch practices may experience not only changes in net returns but also changes in operational risk. Studies on tillage intensity show that slightly increased net returns under reduced or no-tillage are offset by higher variation in net returns thus increased risk (Klemme; Mikesell, Williams, and Long; Williams, Llewelyn, and Barnaby; Epplin and Al-Sakkaf) . This may imply that to stimulate adoption the development of insurance programs partially alleviating risk may be desirable.
b) Management requirements can be more demanding for mitigation related strategies, particularly less tillage-intensive practices. Farmers may be unwilling to adopt practices that require substantially more critical management activities and a long learning time.
This may be particularly true of older farmers nearing retirement. Extension efforts and insurance may be needed to facilitate adoption. c) Many farmers are motivated by a stewardship role in terms of the soil and the environment. In that context one may find that farmers would more easily adopt soil conserving techniques than would otherwise be the case.
d)
A number of the mitigation practices, once adopted, have to remain in use for a long time if GHGE gains are to be captured and maintained. Farmers may be unwilling to take on such long-term commitments and it may be difficult to pass on the commitment and monitor continued performance when farm ownership changes. Leasing arrangements may also create obstacles.
Incentive Program Design
Incentive programs which capture gains through emission reductions need to be carefully designed with respect to four big issues: 1) preservation of gains over time, 2) discouragement of countervailing actions, 3) avoidance of unintended program expenses (hitting more than the target), and 4) diminution of nonpoint sink uncertainties.
Preservation of Gains over Time
Many mitigative strategies regarding sinks result in increased absorption of GHGs until a new equilibrium state is reached. Growth rates of both trees and soil carbon accelerate over the first few decades, but decline as trees reach maturity or soils approach a new carbon equilibrium (Sprugel) .
Tillage experiments have shown that the carbon content of agricultural soils changes up to 30-40 years after tillage alteration (Hendrix) . Many sink strategies have three important features. First, they cannot be counted as a recurring annual sink for GHG. Initially, they offset emissions, but later their net emission reduction falls close to zero as the new equilibrium is approached. Second, if after some time the management of the sink changes to a less "friendly" basis such as plowing the land, harvesting the trees, or adopting conventional tillage, then the stored GHG's volatize rapidly. Thus, management alterations once began must be retained. Third, the holding ability of carbon in soils may diminish as the climate warms as there is a negative relationship between higher temperatures and the organic matter content of soils (Kutsch and Kappen).
Countervailing Actions
The adoption of certain emission reduction strategies in one economy segment may lead to a substantial offset by countervailing actions in other parts of the economy. For example, McCarl recently found that land converted to forest under a carbon-based subsidy program would revert back to agriculture after one forest rotation unless the program was somehow designed to not let the land be harvested or to make it stay within the forest sector. In addition, he discovered a substantial countervailing movement of land from the traditional forest sector back into the agricultural sector when a carbon subsidy caused large amounts of land to be afforested. A program with a semi permanent ban on harvesting and a non reversion to agriculture clause might be required to maintain the gain over the long term. This will raise program cost.
Hitting More than the Target
The design of an incentive scheme may pose challenging policy targeting questions and could encounter unintended expenses. Our history of targeting nonpoint source pollution phenomena in agriculture has been checkered (Malik, Larson, and Ribaudo) . The conservation reserve program, for example, helped reducing soil erosion significantly. However, the program most likely incurred unwanted expenses by paying farmers for enrollment of land that was not intended to be cultivated anyway. In the carbon arena, incentives designed to keep land in forestry might end up paying land owners who had no real intention of ever moving land out of forestry.
Uncertainty of Nonpoint Sinks
Acceptance of agricultural sink strategies implies the establishment of a trading scheme involving land in many diverse areas of the country. Unfortunately, emission savings from some sink enhancements are not perfectly correlated to land management, thus uncertainties result. The wide spread nature of possible participants coupled with the uncertainties may dampen the enthusiasm for including such sinks in a national or international emissions trading scheme and may discourage nonagricultural interests from approaching agriculture for permit trades. Taff and Senjem find that trading schemes' success depends on the nonpoint sinks' ability to offer remedial practices that are at once visible and whose effectiveness can be predicted within acceptable degrees of certainty.
Property Rights
Programs which tax or regulate alterations of land-use, will cause private property rights issues to arise. Public discussion of such issues has been observed, for example, when land-use changes have been restricted in order to preserve endangered species whose habitat is dependent on private property. Consider the following questions
Will we allow existing forest owners, who are not being compensated in the program, to choose to deforest their lands and move them into agriculture?
Will harvested forests be taxed in proportion to any carbon released?
Will farmers who are currently using some form of reduced tillage be allowed to later reverse that decision and use more intensive tillage systems?
Will land owners who now have land in some form of grass or forested lands and develop that land into tilled agricultural lands have to pay for emissions?
Will land that is currently rather minimally disturbed in the agriculture or forest sectors but moves into subdivisions or other uses that diminish the carbon storage potential be requiring emission permits ?
All of these appear to be major property rights issues.
Trade and Program Participation by Trade Competitors
The concept that not all countries will be treated equally, largely because of their development status, is prominent in the Kyoto protocol with the Annex B etc. country discussion. The Farm Bureau has stated opposition to adoption of the protocol because certain key competitive agricultural countries such as Brazil and Argentina are not covered (Francl) . The Bureau's analysts feel U.S. farmers will lose their comparative advantage if they need to obey GHGE regulations while key competitive agricultural producing countries do not. Such an issue may well have to be resolved before countries like the United States ratify the protocol.
Eligibility of Agricultural Sinks
There are a variety of agricultural land-management practices that might enhance sinks or limit emissions. However, only the forestry activities involving afforestation, reforestation and deforestation appear eligible under the current phrasing of the Kyoto Protocol. Article 3.4 leaves the way open to add other items in the list at some future time but as of yet this has not occurred.
Concluding Comments --Agriculture as a Bridge to the Future
Agriculture with the near-term possibilities for changes in tillage and/or forest incidence offers a near-term way of reducing GHGE which may or may not persist at a future date. The essential question is whether agriculture provides a way of reducing current compliance costs before major nonagricultural technological breakthroughs are available which reduce dependency on fossil fuels and lower future GHGE, such as the long awaited fusion development. Many of the above cost estimates seem low enough that agricultural strategies may have a role at least as bridge to future nonagricultural technological fixes. In meeting such agreements as the Kyoto Protocol, agricultural participation may be highly desirable as there are cheap GHGE reductions or offsets. However, the 10 years until the commitment period are short. GHGE offset strategies will be cheapest when trees and soil carbon reach their maximum growth rates which in the case of trees will not uniformly happen by the critical Kyoto dates. Agriculture certainly will respond if proper incentives or markets are provided as the historic participation in such programs as the U.S. conservation reserve program, farm program and payment in kind programs indicate. Above and below ground carbon, study analyzed annual carbon flux increase, cost estimates are undiscounted, see Figure 3 Dudek and Leblanc Tree planting 3 to 12 35
McCarl Tree planting wide range wide range Supply curve up to 40 billion metric tons -see Figure 3 Parks and Hardie Tree planting 9 to 10 42 (annually) 
